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This article explains how debt markets have malfunctioned in the crisis, with deleterious consequences
for the real economy. I begin with a quick overview of debt markets. I then discuss three areas that
are crucial in all debt markets decisions: risk capital and risk aversion, repo financing and haircuts,
and counterparty risk. In each of these areas, feedback effects can arise, so that less liquidity and a
higher cost for finance can reinforce each other in a contagious spiral. I document the remarkable rise
in the premium that investors placed on liquidity during the crisis. Next, I show how these issues caused
debt markets to break down: fundamental values and market values seemed to diverge across several
markets and products that were far removed from the “toxic” subprime mortgage assets at the root
of the crisis. Finally, I discuss briefly four steps that the Federal Reserve took to ease the crisis, and
how each was geared to a specific systemic fault that arose during the crisis.
Arvind Krishnamurthy
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    Banks  Insurers  Hedge Funds 
+ Other 
Real Estate Loans  $7100 billion  150 15  40
ABS + ABS CDOs     2150  260 110  40
Prime mortgage‐backed 
securities 
  3800  20 10  <5
Commercial mortgage‐
backed securities 
    940  85 25  20
Corporate Debt + CLOs     4650  135 40  30























US Treasuries (short‐term)  2%  2%  2%  2% 
US Treasuries (long‐term)  5  5  6  6 
Agency Mortgage‐Backed Securities   2.5  6  8.5  6.5 
Corporate Bonds 
A‐/A3 or above 
5  10  20  20 
Collateralized Mortgage Obligations 
(CMOs)  AAA 
10  30  40  40 
Asset Backed Securities (ABS) 
AA/Aa2 and above 
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Figure 1: Flows in the Repo Market 
 
 
 
 
 
Repo Lenders: Institutional 
Cash Investors including 
Other Banks, Money 
Market Funds, Corporations 
Repo Borrowers 
(Trading Desks, 
Hedge Funds) 
Wall 
Street
Banks  
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Figure 2: Dealer Repo Activity ($Billions, Rolling Monthly Average) 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
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Figure 3: CDS Rates (Basis Points) 
Source: Datastream 
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FNMA BONDS 
   
Figure 4: FNMA Spreads to Treasuries (bps) 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
 
 
 
Govt takeover of FNMA   
 
35
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: 3­Month Treasury Bill, 3­Month OIS, Fed Funds Target (%) 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Figure 6: Ratio of Overnight Repo to Term Repo (1 Month Average) 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York  
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Figure 7: Commercial Paper Issuance (Millions of $) 
Source: Federal Reserve 
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Figure 8: 30 Year Swaps. Interest Rates (left­axis) and Spread (right­axis) in%.  
Source: Federal Reserve 
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Figure 9: OAS on GNMA 6s versus Swap Rates (%) 
Source: Bloomberg 
 